When the Practice Gets Complicated: Human Rights, Migrants, and Political Institutions by Belic, Jelena
1 
 
When the Practice Gets Complicated: 
Human Rights, Migrants and Political Institutions⃰ 
 
Jelena Belic 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The triad of terms in the subtitle may make it sound as if this chapter will be introducing quite a 
complex argument. Indeed, it may appear to take a lot of argumentative work to connect human 
rights, migrants and political institutions. Yet, the argument presented in this chapter is not a 
complex one. On the contrary, it builds on a simple and broadly shared intuition that human rights 
are the rights of all human beings, including migrants. In this chapter, I set out to explore the 
implications of the universality of human rights for conceptualizing their political role.  
In the recent debate concerning the nature and function of human rights, more and more 
voices argue that a theory of human rights needs to account for the political role human rights play 
in practice. Two aspects of that role are particularly salient in these discussions. Namely, human 
rights not only constrain the states’ conduct but may also provide pro tanto reasons for 
international intervention (Rawls 1999; Raz 2007; Beitz 2009). By defining human rights as a 
necessary condition of state legitimacy, this view focuses on the human rights of those residing 
within states’ borders and the correlated duties of their own states. However, this view does not 
seem to capture well the complexity of contemporary human rights practice. For, if we take 
seriously universality of human rights, then their political role cannot be narrowed down to the 
relation between states and their citizens, but also needs to explain the relationship between 
individuals and all political institutions (Peter 2013). In this regard, the human rights of migrants 
seem to be a good litmus test. 
It is ordinarily thought that individuals are morally entitled to human rights irrespective of 
the place they find themselves: ceteris paribus, residing out of the country of one’s nationality 
should not affect her human rights entitlements; but given the way states tend to treat migrants, 
                                                          
⃰ This is an (almost) final version of the chapter that was published in Moral and Political Conceptions of Human 
Rights: Implications for Theory and Practice, Reidar Maliks and Johan Schafer (eds.), Cambridge University Press 
(2017), pp. 157 – 180      
 I have significantly benefited from discussing the earlier versions of the chapter with Zoltan Miklosi, Andres Moles, 
Janos Kis, Johan Karlsson Schaffer, Luise Katharina Muller, Christian Barry, Bob Goodin, Reidar Maliks, and Laura 
Valentini.            
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often it does. Yet, if we accept that human rights are universal as well as claimable, then we need 
to clarify in what sense the human rights of migrants are claimable against foreign states. 
Considering this aspect of the claimability of human rights is important for two reasons. First, the 
current forcible displacement crisis shows how states too easily trade off the human rights of 
migrants for the rights of their citizens. I call this the trade-off problem. This kind of trade-off 
decreases the normative significance of the human rights of migrants, which further questions 
universality of human rights as such. Therefore, any conception of human rights that considers 
them universal has to make the rights of migrants and those of citizens compossible. Second, 
thinking about claimability of the human rights of migrants against foreign states can also reveal 
a critical force of human rights, and help us evaluate existing practice accordingly. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I start by describing the approach I am taking here as a 
version of the moral conception. Second, I explain what kind of challenge is raised by the 
relationship between migrants and foreign states. I then focus on the universality of human rights 
and show how it is reflected in their current political role. In the fourth section, I undertake a 
threefold task. First, I introduce the distinction between human rights as external reasons, i.e. 
common humanity, and as deliberated internal reasons, i.e. reasonable acceptability. In the 
subsequent two sections, I show why human rights taken as external rather than as deliberated 
internal reasons can better address the trade-off problem. In the end, I draw implications for 
conceptualizing the relation between migrants and states. 
 
Human Rights: Moral and/or Political?  
Let me begin by describing a theoretical landscape and situating the approach I will take here. 
Human rights appear to have a dual nature. On the one hand, they are moral entitlements of all 
human beings possessed in virtue of common humanity. On the other hand, human rights are 
political in the sense that they place constraints over political institutions’ conduct. Recently, 
philosophers have started conceptualizing these two aspects of human rights, i.e. moral and 
political one, in a way that makes them mutually exclusive. The moral conception holds that human 
rights are moral rights that individuals hold independently from the existing institutional 
arrangements (Simmons 2000; Griffin 2008). The political conception, by contrast, defines human 
rights in terms of the role they play in giving reasons for actions in a global political discourse 
(Rawls 1999; Raz 2007; Beitz 2009). However, conceptualizing the moral and political aspects of 
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human rights as mutually exclusive threatens to rob both conceptions of their explanatory force. 
The moral conception is often objected to being unable to explain a distinctive role human rights 
play against institutions, while the political conception is said to be incapable of explaining why 
we have the rights we have. 
In the more recent literature on this matter, philosophers started taking the “middle ground” 
approach. For instance, the structural pluralist account attempts to preserve the moral nature of 
human rights, while accounting for their role against political institutions as the primary duty 
bearers (Barry and Southwood 2011). Similarly, one can argue that the political and the moral 
conception are in fact complementary, and we need to combine them if we want to understand 
contemporary human rights practice (Gilabert 2011). The middle ground approach is also favored 
by the freedom-centered view according to which human rights are grounded in a Kantian 
conception of the innate right to freedom, and political institutions are constitutive of human rights 
(Valentini 2012). All these approaches seem successful in reconciling the moral and political 
aspects of human rights. Importantly, neither is committed to the view that states are the only 
primary duty bearers.  
Nonetheless, this cannot be the whole story – the point is not only to show that human 
rights as moral rights are in fact consistent with taking political institutions as the primary duty 
bearers but also to explain distinctive political implications human rights so understood may have. 
This is important since it can help us not only to better understand the role human rights play but 
also to fully grasp their critical potential. I take on that task here. More specifically, I will defend 
a version of the moral conception that articulates political implications of human rights taken as 
moral rights and based on this offers a normative account of the role the human rights of migrants 
play against foreign states. I will start making my case by describing a challenge that the human 
rights of migrants raise for states. 
 
 
Migrants and States               
Migrations are a persistent feature of the world that raises a set of contestable issues concerning 
the relationship between states and foreigners.1 The current unprecedented displacement of people 
                                                          
1 To be sure, individuals come into contact with foreign states even when they reside in their home states by virtue of 
being affected by states’ foreign policies. However, addressing this issue would take us too far from the present 
discussion. For the seminal discussion of the problem cross-border affectedness creates for territorially limited demos, 
see Robert E. Goodin 2007. “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
4 
 
reveals a need for a critical assessment of existing practices as well as a proper specification of the 
relationship between migrants and different kinds of political institutions. The number of 
international migrants has reached 244 million in 2015. This figure includes almost 20 million 
refugees (UN International Migration Report 2015). In the light of these considerations, we need 
to identify what human rights migrants are entitled to and accordingly, how they should be treated 
by the foreign states.2 For instance, should economic migrants have the same status as refugees? 
Are there justifiable limits to a number of refugees that a receiving country can accept? Can 
receiving states treat migrants however they find appropriate? The current refugee crisis shows 
that this indeed can be the case in practice since rights set forth by international conventions are 
often set aside even by law-abiding states. In other words, states too easily trade off the human 
rights of migrants for those of their citizens. I have already identified this as the trade-off problem. 
The trade-off problem appears whenever governments, in the name of legitimacy-related reasons 
owed to their citizens, downplay claims of migrants. To be sure, we can question the governments’ 
rhetoric that rights of citizens clash with rights of migrants, but that would be a too easy task to 
do. Here I take the trade-off at its face value and consider ways in which it can be constrained.  
The trade-off problem raises two morally pressing questions. First, in what sense do 
migrants have human rights? Second, if migrants have human rights, in what sense are they 
claimable against foreign states? Let me emphasize that I am focusing on a generic category of 
migrants, meaning all those that cross international borders for whatever reason. While different 
categories of migrants, e.g. refugees and economic migrants, are entitled to different sets of legal 
rights, what they have in common is the entitlement to at least minimal human rights. Since in the 
chapter I aim to articulate possible political implications of universal human rights, these 
differences in legal entitlements do not affect my argument. Even more, to focus on the way states 
treat refugees would only amount to criticizing states for violating international refugee law. The 
point I want to make here is more general, for it aims to offer a normative account of such treatment 
able to address any trade-off between the human rights of migrants and those of citizens, 
irrespective of what particular situation of these migrants is.  
                                                          
35/1: 40–68; for the reply showing that such affectedness need not entail entitlement to rights of participation, see 
Zoltan Miklosi 2012. “Against the Principle of All Affected Interests,” Social Theory and Practice 38/3: 483–503 
2 There is a growing body of law setting forth rights of migrants, the most important being “International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,” 1990. 
5 
 
First, if we take human rights as weighty claims which are “generally suspect” to trade-
offs (O’Neill 2015, p. 73), and if, at the same time, the human rights of migrants are so easily 
traded off, it makes one wonder if migrants have human rights at all. One can object here that the 
human rights of migrants are different from the rights of citizens and that the latter surely have 
priority. Indeed, legally speaking, states parties to international conventions undertake obligations 
to primarily protect the rights of their own citizens. However, while citizenship rights normally 
incorporate human rights, they do not exhaust it. For instance, all persons have a claim against 
torture whether or not they are citizens of a state concerned. Therefore, while citizens are entitled 
to citizenship rights; human rights are universal entitlements of all human beings. To ignore this 
point would amount to identifying human rights with rights of citizenship, in which case one could 
wonder why we need a category of human rights at all.  
The trade-off problem is distinctive in one more respect. Namely, the human rights of 
migrants are often set aside for the sake of maximizing interests of citizens. For instance, 
governments often invoke reasons of security or those of protecting the welfare rights of their 
citizens to justify strict immigration policies. Leaving aside empirical controversies underpinning 
such rationale, what this shows is that such aggregation of the citizens’ interests easily outweighs 
individual claims of migrants. Yet, this conflicts with a broadly shared intuition that persons do 
not lose their human rights once they cross international borders. Therefore, if we want to show 
that migrants are, just as all other human beings, entitled to human rights, we need to explain in 
what sense their rights are claimable against foreign states.  
To conceptualize the claimability of the human rights of migrants we need to start from the 
political nature of human rights. Namely, human rights are considered political by virtue of 
constraining states’ conduct. Since state institutions are “inescapable” and heavily shape individual 
lives, human rights impose limits on them (Valentini 2012a). If the coercive impact states’ 
institutions have over individuals residing within their borders is what explains the political nature 
of human rights, one can argue that the same holds for those attempting to enter. Indeed, civic 
boundaries are instances of force that is exercised over both members and nonmembers. This kind 
of coercion is inescapable for all those attempting to enter a foreign state (Abizadeh 2008). If this 
argument is sound, then we should start thinking whether the human rights of migrants can serve 
as evaluative criteria for states’ institutions. For instance, is it plausible to argue that violations of 
the human rights of migrants can pro tanto justify intervention the same way it does in a case of 
6 
 
the rights of citizens? If not, why not? Given that the human rights of migrants are a subset of the 
rights of all human beings, to answer this question we first need to examine the political 
implications of universal human rights. 
 
 
Universality and Political Role of Human Rights  
 
It is a broadly shared intuition that human rights are the rights of all human beings. While there 
are disputes over human rights’ temporal dimension, the spatial one seems rather uncontroversial 
– that human beings in all places are entitled to human rights3. The universality of human rights is 
reflected in their current political role in three respects including the scope of institutions, the 
nature of the political role, and the nature of the justification of human rights. Let me briefly 
explain.  
 
Universal Scope 
If human rights are the rights of all human beings, then all human beings have human rights against 
all political institutions. We normally do not think that individuals lose their human rights when 
they leave the state of their citizenship.4 Yet, one may object here that a person surely has a 
different claim against his or her own state and against other states. In support of this view, one 
can invoke the famous distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. The argument would be 
that it is only a claim against one’s own state that gives rise to a perfect duty since it is clear that 
                                                          
3 Philosophers disagree whether human rights are timeless, as those grounding human rights in humanity seem to be 
committed to, or they are synchronically universal, which follows from grounding human rights in contemporary 
practice. The first view is attributed to the moral conception, while the second is shared by the political conception. 
Even though I am not concerned with the temporal dimension of human rights here, let me note two difficulties that 
rooting human rights in the contemporary practice seems to face. First, it may not support the claim that human rights 
are synchronically universal for a simple reason that those synchronically existing may not live under the same social 
conditions. Second, there are good reasons to include human rights entitlements of future people within the scope of 
universal human rights since future people are significantly affected by the actions of present people. Yet, if social 
conditions are what matters for human rights entitlements, then future people, meaning those that diachronically exist, 
have no human rights, even though they are affected by those synchronically existing. This shows how insisting on 
the present social conditions, rather than actions of those synchronically existing, limits the account of human rights. 
I am thankful to Bob Goodin for pointing this out. 
4 Depending on circumstances, persons crossing borders may lose their citizenship rights. But even this is restricted 
since no state is allowed to revoke the citizenship rights of persons that have not previously acquired citizenship of 
another country. The rationale is that no state can make persons stateless. For details, see "Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons," UNHCR, 1954; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness," UNHCR, 1961.  
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the state of one’s citizenship is the duty bearer. When it comes to migrants, however, it is not clear 
which states are duty bearers and on what grounds they can hold these duties. Hence, the human 
rights of migrants do not correlate with perfect duties, and accordingly, are not rights sensu stricto. 
However, when it comes to the human rights of migrants, what is morally relevant is not the 
specification of duty bearers, but its specifiability (Griffin 2008, pp. 108–10). For instance, in order 
to secure a higher standard of protection for asylum seekers, the European Union has enacted the 
so-called Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation sets a hierarchy of criteria for identifying the 
EU member states responsible for the examination of asylum claims in Europe, such as family 
links or the country of the first entry.5 This shows that allocating responsibilities is practical, rather 
than a normative question. It follows that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties has 
no significant moral relevance. Accordingly, the human rights of migrants are not less important 
rights just because they are rights against all political institutions. 
 
 
Evaluative Role 
The universality of human rights is also reflected in the nature of their political role. Namely, 
human rights serve as evaluative standards for all political institutions in two senses. First, 
universal entitlements give us critical leverage to evaluate existing institutions. For instance, 
human rights records of states include, among the rest, their treatment of migrants. Second, the 
universality of human rights can also help us search for alternative forms of institutional 
arrangements that can better protect them.  
One might object here that insisting on the evaluative role of human rights is based on 
understanding these rights as standards rather than claims. The problem with taking human rights 
as standards is that it decreases their moral weight in the sense that it shifts the focus from human 
rights violations to human rights unfulfillment (Valentini 2012). However, the objection is 
grounded in a narrow understanding of human rights’ evaluative role for there is no reason to think 
that emphasizing their evaluative role commits one to take human rights as standards only. Indeed, 
one can argue that institutions are evaluated precisely based on how much they respect rights as 
claims.  
                                                          
5 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; “EUR-Lex – 32013R0604 – EN – 
EUR-Lex,” 2013. 
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The Nature of Justification 
Finally, the universality of human rights is intrinsically related to the way they are justified, i.e. 
they are to be justified by their significance for right holders. This constrains what kind of 
justification of human rights is appropriate. For instance, the principle of non-refoulement, which 
is the bedrock principle of international refugee law, holds that state parties cannot send the 
refugees back to their home state if there is a risk that they will face persecution. The non-
refoulement principle is justified by protecting the basic interests of refugees, including their right 
to life and protection from torture.6 Therefore, it is only if human rights are properly justified that 
they can play a political role against all political institutions.  
In sum, the universality of human rights shapes their political role in a sense that these are 
rights against all political institutions, they help us evaluate these institutions and they are justified 
by their importance for right holders. Importantly, these considerations are not theoretical only, 
but they characterize the contemporary practice, too. These considerations notwithstanding, we 
could see that the existing practice is also characterized by what I defined as the trade-off problem 
– that states too easily trade off the rights of migrants for the rights of their citizens, thus decreasing 
a normative significance of the former. While the existing legal entitlements may give us some 
ground to criticize such practice, it is not sufficient since the legal rights of citizens will always 
prevail. This reveals a fundamental tension between the rights of citizenship on the one hand, and 
universal human rights on the other. Resolving the tension, however, is a too large task to 
undertake here. What I intend to do instead is to examine which conception of human rights can 
give migrants’ rights more weight. This is important since it will help us conceptualize a political 
role the human rights of migrants can play against foreign states. In order to do so, I will go back 
to the debate between the political and moral conception of human rights. 
 
 
Human Rights, Legitimacy and Justification  
 
So far, I have argued that the fact that states too easily trade off the human rights of migrants for 
those of their citizens creates a problem for a broadly shared view that human rights are rights of 
all human beings. Therefore, any conception of human rights as the universal entitlement of all 
                                                          
6 “UNHCR 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” art. 33. 
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human beings has to be able to constrain such trade-offs, meaning that it has to offer an account 
of human rights such that it gives more weight to the human rights of migrants. This need not 
necessarily lead to outweighing rights of citizens but can at least constrain a set of reasons 
governments can invoke to justify such trade-offs. Clearly, how much weight the human rights of 
migrants might have depends on the way we understand these rights. Here I will assess which of 
the two dominant understandings of human rights – the political conception or the moral 
conception can better address the trade-off problem. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
To examine which conception can better address the trade-off problem, we need to start from the 
way they understand human rights. This might appear like an impossible task to do since two 
conceptions of human rights aim for different things. Namely, the political conception mostly 
attempts to define human rights, while the moral conception is focused on their justification.7 More 
specifically, the political conception defines human rights in relation to the role they play in 
practice as constituting a set of necessary, though not sufficient standards that states should comply 
with. On the other hand, the moral conception focuses on justifying human rights on practice-
independent grounds. While the two approaches might appear impossible to compare, we should 
bear in mind that even though separate, the role of human rights and their justification are 
interdependent notions. For, human rights cannot play a role against political institutions unless 
they are properly justified. Also, the features of their political role affect the way we want to justify 
them. An important part of philosophizing about human rights is to get the relation between their 
role and justification right. 
To make a comparison between the political and the moral conception possible, I will use 
a modified version of Williams’s distinction between “internal” and “external” reasons (Williams 
1982). I shall not attempt any discussion of the distinction as such but will take it at its face value 
as a useful conceptual tool. The difference between internal and external reasons may be stated as 
follows.  
Internal reason: A has a reason to Φ. The proposition is true if and only if A has an aim 
that will be served by his Φ-ing. 
                                                          
7 I am thankful to Laura Valentini for helping me clarify this. 
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External reason: There is a reason for A to Φ. The truth of the proposition is not relative 
to the agent’s subjective motivational set.8 
I depart from Williams’s distinction in two respects. First, I use external reasons in a form 
of “ought,” while Williams does not discuss the external reasons in relation to morality. Second, I 
modify the distinction by introducing two versions of internal reasons. I will call these “actual” 
and “deliberated” internal reasons. I introduce this modification in order to more accurately capture 
the political conception’s understanding of human rights. Here is the modified version of 
distinction: 
Actual internal reason: A has an actual reason to Φ. 
Deliberated internal reason: A would have a reason to Φ if he had deliberated from his 
subjective motivational set. 
Therefore, while both forms of internal reasons rely on the existence of the subjective 
motivational set of the agent to Φ, the difference is that in the first case it is the actual reason for 
A to Φ, whereas in the second a reason to Φ would come as a result of internal deliberation. Let 
me now apply the distinction to the ways the political and the moral conception understand human 
rights.9  
One can argue that the moral conception takes human rights as the external reasons, i.e. 
reasons whose validity is independent of a subjective motivational set of agents. On the other hand, 
the political conception seems to be closer to defining human rights as the deliberated internal 
reasons, i.e. reasons that agents would endorse had they deliberated from their subjective 
motivational sets. Defining the political conception this way seems to successfully capture its 
central components: definitional one (role human rights play in practice) as well as normative one 
(grounding human rights in interests). In the next two sections, I will assess which kind of reasons 
can yield an account of human rights able to avoid the trade-off problem.  
One may object that the political conception appeals to the actual internal reasons since it 
insists that the justification of certain claims depends on their coherence with the practice. This 
                                                          
8 My specification departs from Williams's idea of external reasons since for him the validity of the proposition stating 
reasons for action is conditional upon the existence of agent's subjective motivational set. The proposition "There is a 
reason for A to Φ" cannot be true unless there is the subjective motivation for agent A to deliberate from. However, 
if deliberation is conducted on the basis of subjective motivation, following Williams, then this is not an external 
reason anymore. It follows that propositions stating external reasons are necessarily false. Since I am using  
external reasons in the form of "ought," I do not consider its validity conditional upon the existence of a subjective 
motivational set. 
9 In a case of states, I take it that the notion of subjective motivational set applies to its political culture. 
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would mean that the political conception mirrors what is known as a sociological approach to 
legitimacy which draws on the Weberian tradition of insisting on the importance of the perceptions 
a society’s members share about their states. In this sense, we count as legitimate those states that 
are actually accepted by their members. The sociological approach, however, does not seem to be 
able to assess the legitimacy from a moral point of view since the normative relevance of existing 
beliefs is difficult to sustain. For, members can be simply mistaken by way of indoctrination or a 
simple error in judgment (Simmons 1999). If the political conception indeed mirrors the 
sociological approach, then the same objections apply to it, too. Yet, the political conception does 
not seem to be conventionalist to that extent. For instance, Beitz argues that the political conception 
is different from “agreement” accounts of human rights in that the latter derives justification of 
human rights from an intercultural agreement, while the political conception grounds human rights 
in interests that are “sufficiently generic that it would be reasonable to expect anyone to recognize 
their importance” (Beitz 2009, pp. 136–37). I take it that insisting on the reasonable expectation 
of acceptability shows that the political conception proponents would endorse a version of the 
deliberated internal reasons to explain human rights. 
 
 
a) The Political Conception 
 
The political conception defines human rights as a sui generis normative practice meaning that 
they represent a set of norms for a class of agents and that it is broadly believed that these norms 
should be complied with. Human rights are the normative practice in the sense that we have to 
have reasons to endorse them as a practice. The method of interpreting the practice aims to provide 
a non-parochial normative foundation of human rights. More precisely, defining the nature of 
human rights by interpreting the practice aims to separate the question of the nature of human 
rights from its content and scope. While the content of human rights may remain a point of dispute, 
a reference to the role human rights play in the practice, on this view, shows in an uncontroversial 
way what human rights are. Thus, human rights are rights individuals have primarily against their 
own states (Beitz 2009, pp. 105–08). Besides playing a role as the legitimating condition of states, 
human rights may also give pro tanto reasons for the interference by external agents in the case of 
noncompliance by a state (Rawls 1999; Raz 2007; Beitz 2009).  
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If human rights are to legitimate states then they have to be justified by reasons acceptable 
to states. As we can see, insisting on the role of human rights as their defining feature allows global 
pluralism to constrain the justification of human rights. However, the political conception surely 
does not want to leave human rights entirely dependent upon the acceptance by all states. Instead, 
it implies that there is a form of mutual constraint between the idea of human rights and states’ 
acceptance which I have tried to capture by introducing the concept of “deliberated internal 
reasons”. As a small reminder, the deliberated internal reasons are the reasons that the agent would 
come up with by deliberating from his actual beliefs and motivations. The reliance on the 
deliberated internal reasons supposes to yield an account of human rights consistent with different 
justifications. As one of its proponents argue, human rights are a public reason formulated 
autonomously from any tradition that can reasonably be expected to be shared by adherents of 
conflicting traditions (Cohen 2006).10 What can human rights so defined say about the trade-off 
problem? By defining human rights as a necessary condition of a state’s legitimacy, it might seem 
that it can easily include the human rights of migrants as one of these conditions and by doing so, 
give us a much-needed critical tool to address the trade-off problem. Yet, I do not think this is the 
case. In the next section, I give reasons to support this skepticism. 
 
 
Human Rights as Deliberated Internal Reasons 
 
As argued earlier, the trade-off problem illustrates the way states often trade off the human rights 
of migrants for those of their citizens. Yet, if we indeed think that human rights are the rights of 
all human beings, we need to formulate an account of human rights such that makes them 
compossible with the rights of citizens. Here I will offer several reasons for why human rights 
defined as the deliberated internal reasons cannot achieve this.  
First, the political conception grounds human rights in universal interests. For example, 
Beitz holds that human rights protect urgent individual interests against standard threats, most of 
which are threats by their own governments (Beitz 2009, p. 207). The appeal to universal interests 
                                                          
10 Recently, it has been argued that the justification of human rights should rely on the principle of inclusion of all, 
rather than on the idea of “autonomous” formulation of human rights as a public reason since the principle of inclusion 
legitimizes many forms of existing societies. For this argument see Peter, “The Human Right to Political 
Participation”; Restated in Fabienne Peter, “A Human Right to Democracy?,” in Philosophical Foundations of Human 
Rights, 2015, 481–90. 
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can count as an adequate justification of human rights since it focuses on the significance of rights 
for right holders. However, there are difficulties in grounding human rights solely in interests, no 
matter how universal they may be. Namely, interests often go beyond rights, for persons can have 
interests in things that they have no right to. I can have an interest in person X, but it hardly follows 
that I have a right to his love. Rights also go beyond interests in the sense that persons have rights 
to things they may have no interest for, such as a right to assemble (O’Neill 2015, p. 72). 
Furthermore, grounding human rights solely in interests might allow the sacrifice of interests of 
individuals for the sake of maximizing interests across persons (Tasioulas 2015). Therefore, it is 
not clear how grounding human rights solely in interests would make the human rights of migrants 
and those of citizens compossible and accordingly, resolve the trade-off problem. 
 Second, defining human rights as the deliberated internal reasons, in order to be successful, 
has to carefully balance between the requirement of relying on the subjective motivational set and 
the requirement of yielding public justification of human rights. The account of the deliberated 
internal reasons will be coherent only if it achieves internalization, i.e. acceptability and still 
remains public. In this respect, the political conception faces a twofold difficulty. First, it might 
run into an internal incoherence. Imagine that a government of country X, characterized as an 
illiberal but legitimate country, treats immigrants differently in respect of civil rights, e.g. imprison 
them without a trial.11 It is not clear what the political conception’s proponents would say. On the 
one hand, since the political conception considers inegalitarian societies legitimate, it may seem 
that it would not condemn the discriminatory treatment of immigrants. On the other hand, such 
treatment significantly endangers the interests of immigrants, so on this ground, the political 
conception may condemn the discriminatory treatment. But the conception cannot yield the 
account of human rights that would both condemn and not condemn instances of human rights 
violations. Second, insisting on the acceptability of human rights implies an individual dependence 
on a particular society. For instance, human rights are defined as the norm of membership in a 
society (Cohen 2006, p. 136). It has already been objected that insisting that human rights are 
rights against states entails that without the states there would be no rights. Such a view "makes 
us . . . hostage to historical fortune” (Barry and Southwood 2011, p. 378). Also, the view is the 
status quo biased for it ties human rights to the evaluation of states only (Valentini 2012). The 
                                                          
11 The political conception is based on the understanding that equal possession of rights is a matter of justice, rather 
than legitimacy. Consequently, legitimate regimes need not be egalitarian. Rawls, The Law of Peoples. p. 69 
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problem generated by such a state-centered view is not only the difficulty of its application to other 
forms of political institutions but also its application to relations between states and all right 
holders. By connecting human rights to membership, the political conception implies that 
justification of human rights is owed to members only. However, as I argued earlier, if the coercive 
impact of states' institutions is what is to be justified, then the justification of such an impact is 
also owed to those attempting to enter (Abizadeh 2008).  
I said earlier that philosophizing about human rights requires getting the relation between 
their role and their justification right. It seems that the political conception gets it in the wrong 
direction. By defining human rights in relation to the role they play in practice, it allows to value 
pluralism to have excessive influence over the justification of human rights. The suggestion seems 
to be that given the value pluralism, human rights have to be acceptable to different states. It 
follows that persons can claim only those rights that are so acceptable to states. Insisting on 
acceptability, no matter how hypothetical it can be, seems to misunderstand the point of human 
rights. To justify human rights is to explain why they are claimable against states, and they cannot 
be claimable because they are acceptable to states. This shows not only that the insistence on 
pluralism is thinning justification of human rights as O’Neill has recently argued (O’Neill 2016) 
but also that insisting on it makes it inadequate to explain a critical role human rights play in the 
practice. By implication, the trade-off between the human rights of migrants and those of citizens, 
in this view, would not appear a problem at all, for the rights of citizens can always prevail. But, 
if stepping aside the human rights of migrants does not appear as a reason to criticize states, then 
indeed it is not clear in what sense migrants have human rights at all. In sum, it seems that human 
rights defined as the deliberated internal reasons cannot explain in what sense the human rights of 
migrants are claimable against foreign states. I turn to the moral conception now. 
 
b) The Moral Conception 
 
Given that proponents of the moral conception have not directly engaged with the task of 
conceptualizing the political role of human rights, I take on that task here. I will offer an account 
that aims to address the long-standing objection that the moral conception cannot account for the 
political role human rights play against states since it grounds human rights in moral rights. For, 
if a violation of personhood is what matters, then all those violating it, either individuals or 
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institutions, are considered violators in the same sense (Beitz 2009; Barry and Southwood 2011; 
Valentini 2012). Consequently, the moral conception is incapable of criticizing existing human 
rights practices (Raz 2007). In this section, I will address the objection in two steps. First, I will 
explain how justifying human rights on the grounds of common humanity can help us solve the 
trade-off problem, and second, I will show how the moral conception can account for political 
nature of human rights. 
 
Human Rights as External Reasons 
 
I already suggested that the moral conception can justify human rights as the external reasons and 
it is a high time to explain what I mean by this. The moral conception’s main claim is that human 
rights are moral entitlements that human beings have by virtue of common humanity. I consider 
the appeal to common humanity an external reason since it is defined independently from the 
practice. The appeal to common humanity is objected on the grounds that we actually cannot define 
common humanity, and consequently, it is not clear why people are equally entitled to human 
rights (Buchanan 2010). It is presumed that we cannot move on to discuss the latter until we find 
a satisfactory answer to the former. Call this the Skeptic View. Let me take a closer look at the 
Skeptic view.  
Here I introduce a distinction between equality in grounding human rights and equality in 
entitlement to human rights.  
Equality in grounding human rights: all human beings are entitled to human rights by virtue 
of equal possession of property X.  
Equal entitlement to human rights: all human beings are equally entitled to human rights.  
The Skeptic View holds that there is a conditional relation between the two propositions. 
If human beings equally possess property X, they are equally entitled to human rights. So far, so 
good. The problem comes with the next argumentative step which states that there are no properties 
equally possessed by all human beings, and consequently, there can be no equal entitlement to 
human rights. In some views, empirical properties vary in degrees and so call for establishing a 
threshold of properties in order to recognize the status of morally equal. Yet, the conditions of 
severally mentally disabled humans and highly cognitive nonhuman animals make the nonarbitrary 
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establishing a threshold for recognizing equal moral status impossible. Consequently, we cannot 
establish moral equality of human beings either (Arneson 1999).  
This claim, however, is troublesome since it is only if we knew for sure that there is 
absolutely no feature common to all human beings in such a way, that we could infer that equality 
in grounding human rights fails. But we still have no reason to believe that it is more likely that 
there is no property equally shared across humanity. Following the principle of insufficient reason 
(Sinn 1980), in a case there is no reason to believe that it is more likely that there is no property 
that is equally shared across humanity rather than that there is, we should assume that both 
outcomes are equally probable.12 Therefore, the epistemic limits we face in establishing what 
property is equally shared across humanity give us a reason to presume that there is an equal chance 
of both positive and negative outcomes. If both outcomes are equally probable, we should presume 
equal possession of properties across humanity given what is at stake, i.e. establishing fundamental 
moral status of all human beings. It follows that whatever we think the grounds of human rights 
are, human beings are equally entitled to human rights.  
Note that there are also normative reasons for avoiding any argumentative conundrum 
concerning the grounds of moral equality. For instance, one could say that the respect for the 
dignity of human beings does not permit any consideration of their scalar properties (Carter 2011). 
Or, one could argue that attributing equal moral worth to everyone does not imply ascribing any 
properties, but rather amounts to expressing an attitude of respect toward the humanity in each 
person (Feinberg 1973, pp. 84–85). Thus, the attitude of equal respect has independent value and 
is not grounded in anything more ultimate.  
The proposition that all human beings are equally morally entitled to human rights has 
twofold implications for the political role human rights play. First, all human beings are entitled 
to human rights against all agents, including all political institutions. Second, common humanity 
not only gives all human beings claims against all agents, but it also generates a reason for it. It is 
precisely because human rights are universal in virtue of common humanity that all human beings 
have rights against all agents, including political institutions.  
What does this tell us about the trade-off between the human rights of migrants and those 
of citizens? I will leave specific implications for the last section. As a general point, grounding 
human rights in common humanity gives more weight to the claims of migrants. To be sure, basic 
                                                          
12 I thank Bob Goodin for drawing my attention to the principle. 
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moral equality does not entail any kind of more robust equal status for this necessitates a further 
argument. What is important is that grounding human rights in the common humanity would count 
as an exclusionary reason against some considerations, such as maximizing interests of citizens. If 
all human beings have the status of morally equal, then the interests of everyone count equally. It 
follows that no person’s human rights can be traded off by appeal to aggregated interests of others 
(Tasioulas 2015). However, it remains to be seen if and if so, how the moral conception, at least 
the version I am defending here, can account for the political role of human rights. 
 
The Political Role of Human Rights 
 
The moral conception is often characterized as being incapable of criticizing the human rights 
practice since it allegedly cannot account for political role human rights play against institutions. 
For the easiness of exposition, I will break the objection into two claims. First, the objection states 
that the moral conception, by considering human rights moral rights, cannot account for their 
claimability. Second, it also cannot address the role human rights play against institutions. In 
response, I make two related claims. First, I argue that moral rights are consistent with 
understanding human rights as claim rights. Second, I also argue that even though claims against 
everyone, moral rights are still important as claims against institutions. 
 
i. Claim rights 
 
Human rights are mostly defined as individual claims that political institutions have a duty to fulfill 
(Barry and Southwood 2011). Following Hohfeld’s famous taxonomy, claim rights are rights in 
the strictest sense since they correlate with the duties of others (Hohfeld 1913). When duty bearers 
reject claims, they effectively violate human rights. By defining human rights as pre-institutional, 
so the objection goes, the moral conception cannot account for their real nature, i.e. that these are 
claim rights. The reason for this is that moral rights are rights against all other individuals, and as 
such are not claim rights proper (Valentini 2012). 
However, taking human rights as moral rights gives rise to their claimability at least in two 
ways. First, the entailment of duty cannot explain the moral significance of having a human right 
(Thomson 1990, p. 59). Instead, it is the features of human beings, such as individual interests, 
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that are the sources of claims. However, as mentioned earlier, the reliance on interests does not 
suffice; instead, it is the moral equality of human beings that gives normative significance to their 
universal interests. In other words, it is because of the equal moral status of everyone that universal 
interests can ground human rights and so impose duties on others (Tasioulas 2015). Furthermore, 
moral rights can be described as abstract “cluster” rights and as such morally significant in at least 
two respects. First, abstract rights give rise to specific rights in specific institutional settings. In 
other words, it is institutions that specify the content of rights as well as of correlated duties 
(Gilabert 2011). Another important implication of connecting human rights to abstract moral rights 
and personhood is that it can explain in what sense human rights are inalienable, and accordingly, 
can protect from the government’s actions. The inalienable character of rights prevents 
governments from causing the alterations in the rights without authorization by those affected 
(Thomson 1990, pp. 280–86). 
 
ii. Rights against institutions  
 
Human rights are defined as rights individuals have against institutions due to crucial role 
institutions play in relation to human rights. Namely, institutions are capable both of significantly 
violating human rights as well as of promoting them. Specifying human rights as a subset of moral 
rights, it is said, cannot account for this, since moral rights are pre-institutional. This objection 
involves two related claims: first, human rights as moral rights can exist without institutions. 
Second, human rights as moral rights are rights individuals have against one another, which cannot 
account for the distinctiveness of institutional human rights violations.  
The objection that human rights cannot be moral rights since the former cannot exist 
without institutions, while the latter can, targets Lockean accounts of natural rights. Yet, one may 
take a Kantian view and argue that human rights may be characterized as pre-institutional 
individual entitlements the guaranteeing of which requires establishing political institutions 
(Valentini 2012). Thus, the relation between human rights and political institutions is more abstract 
in the sense that the fulfillment of human rights requires political institutions as duty bearers. The 
claim that individuals have pre-institutional entitlements can also explain entitlements against 
existing institutions. For instance, there may be a moral right to free speech, but it is only after 
institutions are in place that we get the right to free press or free access to information. Therefore, 
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moral rights not only need to be specified by institutions but also give individuals entitlements 
against institutions once they are in place. 
In this section, I argued that grounding human rights in moral rights has important 
implications for their political role. Namely, the moral nature of rights can explain two defining 
features of human rights – their claimability as well as their inalienability. In addition, I have 
followed a Kantian understanding that moral rights not only require an institutional specification 
but can also explain rights against institutions once institutions are in place. Based on this, it seems 
that the moral conception is able to offer a coherent account of the political role that human rights 
play against all institutions. I turn now to derive more concrete implications for the relationship 
between migrants and states. 
 
 
Going Back to Migrants 
Thinking about human rights as moral rights can help us explain claims of migrants against foreign 
states in two ways – by showing how violation of their rights by their own states gives rise to 
claims against foreign states, but also how migrants have claims against foreign states independent 
from the way they are treated by their own states. First, it can be argued that a violation of A’s 
right by X entitles him to a claim against Y. For instance, individuals that fall victims of a crime 
have a claim against the police. Analogously, persons whose rights are violated by their states have 
claims against other states, similar to those asylum seekers have. A right does not cease to be a 
right if it is violated by a primary duty bearer. In addition to claims generated by violations of 
human rights, human rights also entail different claims against different duty bearers. I may have 
a claim against state B even if my state A has not violated my rights. To illustrate the point, let me 
use an analogy. A child has a claim against its parents to a certain kind of treatment. The child's 
special relationship with its parents generates special rights for it. Now, imagine the child visiting 
its parents’ friends. The child, even though having its parents as the primary duty bearers, still has 
a claim against its hosts to a certain treatment. Yet, it is entitled to this specific treatment not 
because of special rights it has against its parents, but because of its status as a human being, or 
more precisely – a child. Analogously, I have claims against the state B irrespective of claims I 
may have against the state A if I happen to be affected by, or for the purpose of the present 
discussion, have arrived at the borders of the state B. In sum, while violation of human rights by 
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their own states is sufficient to give rise to claims against foreign states, it is not necessary since 
migrants have claims against foreign states irrespective of the way they are treated by their own 
states. I deliberately use the vague phrase “a certain kind of treatment” for it is difficult to exactly 
specify what that treatment in all cases entails. 
Second, grounding human rights in common humanity gives each migrant a claim against 
states on an individual basis in the sense that they are entitled to a dignified treatment as 
individuals. Insisting on the equal moral status of all human beings which entails equal significance 
of interests of each and every one of them implies that states cannot justify the trade-off between 
the human rights of migrants and those of citizens by appealing to the maximization of interests 
of the latter. To be sure, this does not entail that governments cannot put more weight on the 
interests of their citizens, but doing so has to be justified on grounds other than the maximization 
of their interests. 
 Third, insisting on equal importance of interests requires an individualistic approach in the 
sense that foreign governments are to assess individual applications to entry on an individual case-
by-case basis by taking into account particular circumstances of migrants. This can have important 
implications for existing policies. For instance, the burden-sharing policy currently employed to 
deal with the refugee crisis, where states unilaterally accept to take in a certain number of refugees, 
has to be constrained by individual assessments. This means that it is not only numbers that count 
when deciding whom to take in, but also particular circumstances of each and every applicant, 
such as her family ties.  
Fourth, moral rights as a normative idea give us a useful tool not only to criticize the 
practice but also to question the limits of the existing legal entitlements. Namely, if we accept that 
human rights are moral rights, then we have a sufficiently firm ground to question justifiability of 
existing legal rights. For instance, we can question the present distinction between refugees and 
the so-called economic migrants. In this regard, one can argue that the category of refugees should 
also be extended to all those fleeing from poverty and natural disasters. As I mentioned earlier, 
violation of human rights by one’s state is not necessary to give rise to her claims against foreign 
states.  
Finally, acknowledging that the human rights of migrants indeed play a role against foreign 
states enriches the set of evaluative criteria we currently possess for political institutions. Thus, 
apart from being a condition of the legitimacy of states in relation to their citizens, one can argue 
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that the treatment of migrants should be a part of assessing the state's legitimacy as well. This 
would give us a valuable critical tool to assess practices of all states, no matter how democratic 
they might be. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I tried to articulate possible political implications of universal human rights by 
focusing on the relationship between migrants and states. I argued that the fact that states too easily 
trade off the human rights of migrants for those of their citizens creates a problem for a broadly 
shared view that human rights are rights of all human beings. Therefore, any conception of human 
rights as universal entitlements has to be able to constrain such trade-offs, meaning that it has to 
offer an account of human rights such that it allows the compossibility of the human rights of 
migrants and those of citizens.  
I examined which of the two dominant conceptions of human rights – the political and the 
moral one – can offer a better account of such compossibility. In this respect, I made two claims. 
First, I argued that the political conception, by defining human rights in relation to the role they 
play, yields an account of human rights as the deliberated internal reasons, which does not seem 
to give proper weight to the human rights of migrants, and consequently, cannot solve the trade-
off problem. Second, I have also argued that the moral conception, by grounding human rights in 
the common humanity, can secure more weight for the human rights of migrants and accordingly, 
rule out the maximization of interests of citizens as the justification for the trade-off.  
Since the trade-off problem ultimately concerns the justification of human rights, I have 
conducted the discussion at a very abstract level, leaving aside numerous intricate details 
concerning the relationship between states and migrants. My aim has not been to offer a full 
account of such relations, but only to explain their nature. Therefore, I have only scratched a 
surface and more work needs to be done to fully explicate the political implications of human 
rights taken as moral rights. Such a project is worth pursuing, for it can help us remove the 
obstacles to the fulfillment of human rights that the present state system creates. 
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